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MILLS V. MARYLAND: THE SUPREME COURT
GUARANTEES THE CONSIDERATION OF
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
PURSUANT TO LOCKETT V.
OHIO
The underlying goal of the eighth amendment of the United States Consti-
tution' is to guarantee that a state's2 ability to punish criminals is "exercised
within the limits of civilized standards." 3 Contemporary societal values re-
garding the imposition of punishment determine these civilized standards.4
History, traditional usage, jury determinations, and legislative enactments in
the form of death penalty statutes reflect these standards.5 The prevention
of arbitrary and inconsistent imposition of punishment is also included in the
goals of the eighth amendment.6 These goals are questioned when capital
punishment is involved. Arguably, the finality of a death penalty is inconsis-
tent with the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.7
The imposition of capital punishment is a decision unlike any other that a
state and its citizens, as jurors, are called upon to make.8 Capital punish-
1. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unu-
sual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The phrase "cruel and unusual" first
appeared in the English Bill of Rights of 1689. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
2. The fourteenth amendment of the Constitution makes the eighth amendment binding
on the states. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947). The fourteenth amendment provides, in part:
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law[.]" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
4. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976).
5. Id. Jury sentencing maintains the necessary link between community standards and
the penal system. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190.
6. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). The principle
that the state may not arbitrarily inflict severe punishment stems from the idea that the state
disregards human dignity when, without reason, it imposes a severe penalty on some, but not
others. Id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 286. "[T]he fundamental premise of the Clause [is] that even the vilest criminal
remains a human being possessed of common human dignity." Id. at 273.
8. See Mills v. Maryland, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 1870 (1988); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349, 357 (1977).
[D]eath is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in
this country .... From the point of view of the defendant, it is different in both its
severity and its finality. From the point of view of society, the action of the sovereign
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ment expresses society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct.9
Central to an inquiry into the constitutionality of capital punishment stat-
utes is whether the death penalty is appropriate punishment for the crime
charged.' ° Due to the uniqueness and finality of the decision to execute a
person convicted of murder," "[e]volving standards of societal decency
have imposed a correspondingly high requirement of reliability on the deter-
mination that death is the appropriate penalty in a particular case."' 12 Dur-
ing the second half of the twentieth century, the United States Supreme
Court has devoted substantial attention to capital cases.' 3 This attention has
created an evolution in the Court's interpretation of the constitutionality of
capital punishment statutes.14
in taking the life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically from any other legiti-
mate state action. It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community
that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason
rather than caprice or emotion.
Id. at 357-58.
9. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
10. Id. at 187.
11. This Note will only discuss the death penalty as a punishment for murder. The
Supreme Court struck down a Georgia statute imposing capital punishment for a rape convic-
tion. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). The Court held that the punishment of
death for a rape conviction was grossly disproportionate and excessive if no murder is in-
volved. Id. at 598. The Coker decision implied that no state statute may invoke the death
penalty as a punishment for a crime in which no life is taken. See Combs, The Supreme Court
and Capital Punishment. Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Judicial Control, 7 S.U.L. REV. 1, 33
(1980). Some states, however, still consider some crimes, such as aggravated kidnapping, ag-
gravated rape, treason, skyjacking, and certain drug offenses, as capital crimes. See Special
Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1222-24 (1984). The federal government may punish espionage as a
capital offense, although there is currently no death mechanism. See 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
12. Mills v. Maryland, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 1870 (1988).
13. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988); Maynard v. Cartwright,
108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); Baldwin v. Alabama, 472
U.S. 372 (1985); Eddmonds v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 894, 895 (1984) (Marshall, J. dissenting);
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984); Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410 (1982); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Estelle v. Jurek, 450 U.S. 1014 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349 (1977); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971);
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
Several groups attacked the death penalty, such as the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund. Combs, supra note 11, at 4. An unofficial stay on execution in the United States
began in 1967. Special Project, supra note 11, at 1130 n.3. Such heightened opposition to
capital punishment probably caused the Supreme Court's increased scrutiny of death penalty
statutes. Id.
14. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982). Justice Powell described the evolu-
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Throughout history, societies have attempted, generally without success,
to categorize before the fact specific types of murder for which capital pun-
ishment would be appropriate. '" For example, when the eighth amendment
was adopted in 1791, the states maintained the common law practice of im-
posing a mandatory death penalty for specific offenses, such as murder.'
6
Juries, however, viewed mandatory death penalties with disfavor from the
outset,' 7 resulting in a rebellion against the common law practice."8 State
legislatures responded to this hostility by limiting the number of capital
offenses. '9
The American public, however, remained dissatisfied with state legislative
attempts to curtail the imposition of capital punishment by limiting the
number of capital offenses. As a result, juries took the law into their own
hands.2" De facto jury discretion subsequently developed as a method of
avoiding the mandatory imposition of the death penalty in cases where the
tion of the death penalty statue as the "product of a considerable history reflecting the law's
effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consistent and principled but also
humane and sensible to the uniqueness of the individual." Id.
15. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197 (1971). The Bible may be regarded as the
first attempt to categorize classes of offenses for which capital punishment was appropriate.
The thirty-fifth chapter of the Book of Numbers states:
[1] The Lord spoke to Moses in the steppes of Moab at the Jordan near Jericho,
saying: ... [10] "Speak to the Israelite people and say to them: When you cross the
Jordan to the land of Canaan, [11] you shall provide yourselves with places to serve
you as cities of refuge to which a manslayer who has killed a person unintentionally
may flee. [12] The cities shall serve you as a refuge from the avenger, so that the
manslayer may not die unless he has stood trial before the assembly...
[16] Anyone, however, who strikes another with an iron object so that death re-
sults is a murderer; the murderer must be put to death. [17] If he struck him with a
stone tool that could cause death, and death resulted, he is a murderer; the murderer
must be put to death. [18] Similarly, if the object with which he struck him was a
wooden tool that could cause death, and death resulted, he is a murderer; the mur-
derer must be put to death ... [20] So, too, if he pushed him in hate or hurled
something at him on purpose and death resulted, [21] or if he struck him with his
hand in enmity and death resulted, the assailant shall be put to death; he is a mur-
derer. The blood-avenger shall put the murderer to death upon encounter.
35 Numbers 1:21.
16. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976). At the time of the American
Revolution, the colonies imposed death sentences on all persons convicted of any of a variety
of crimes, ranging from murder to treason, piracy, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, and sodomy.
Id. See H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 3, 6-9 (3d ed. 1982).
17. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
18. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 198.
19. Id. at 198-99. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 246 (1972) (Douglas, J. concur-
ring). Pennsylvania was the first state to abolish capital punishment except for "murder of the
first degree," and many states followed suit. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 198 (citing Pa. Laws 1794,
c. 1777).
20. McGautha, 402 U.S. -at 199; Furman, 408 U.S. at 246-47 (Douglas, J., concurring).
1989]
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jury found execution inappropriate.2 ' Juries continued to find the death
penalty an inappropriate punishment in many first degree murder cases and,
consequently, refused to return guilty verdicts.22
Jury nullification2 3 and the inadequate attempt to distinguish offenders
through legislative criteria24 led the states to grant juries broad sentencing
discretion in capital cases.25 Rather than continuing to redefine capital
homicides, the Federal Government finally authorized juries to impose the
death penalty in 1897.26 In Winston v. United States,27 the Supreme Court
gave the jury discretion to determine whether the imposition of capital pun-
ishment for a murder conviction was appropriate.28 Despite the American
Law Institute's 1959 recommendation 29 that capital punishment statutes
specifically identify aggravating and mitigating circumstances3° with which
21. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 199.
22. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 291 (1976); BEDAU, supra note 16, at 9-10.
23. Jury nullification refers to a jury's refusal to convict capital offenders to avoid auto-
matic death sentences. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 290.
24. When Congress enacted the eighth amendment, all states followed the common law
practice of inflicting the death penalty exclusively and mandatorily for certain specified of-
fenses. Id. at 289. Due to jurors' unwillingness to impose mandatory death sentences, state
legislatures eventually limited the classes of capital offenses. Id. at 290.
25. Id. at 291; McGautha, 402 U.S. at 199. Tennessee was the first state to grant jury
sentencing discretion. Id. at 200.
26. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 200 (citing Act of Jan. 15, 1897, ch. 29, § 1, 29 Stat. 487).
27. 172 U.S. 303 (1899).
28. Id. at 312-13. The Supreme Court relied on Congress' Act of 1897, see supra note 26,
which conferred upon the jury the right to decide whether the punishment in a murder case
should be death or imprisonment. 172 U.S. at 313. In reversing the judgments of the three
murder cases before it, the Court held that the judge's instructions to the jury were erroneous
because they led the jury to understand that it could not impose imprisonment unless mitigat-
ing circumstances were shown. Id. The Court held that the instructions attempted to control
the discretionary power that Congress had vested in the jury. Id.
29. Special Project, supra note 11, at 1133. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1959) (revised and approved in 1962 as § 201.6 of the Proposed Official Draft). Section
201.6 of the Model Penal Code: Proposed Official Draft (1962) is included in an appendix to
the McGautha v. California opinion. See McGautha, 402 U.S. at 222-25.
30. Aggravating circumstances weigh in favor of imposing the death penalty. There are
generally five broad areas of aggravation: 1) defendant's motive, such as killing for pecuniary
reasons; 2) defendant's cruelty in method and manner of the offense, such as "heinous, atro-
cious or exceptionally brutal"; 3) defendant's background, such as whether the defendant was
incarcerated at the time of the offense; 4) circumstances surrounding the offense, such as
whether the offense occurred during the commission of another felony; and 5) the victim(s) of
the offense, for example a police officer. See Special Project, supra note 11, at 1227-32.
Mitigating circumstances weigh in favor of mercy. Types of mitigating factors include: 1)
age/youth of the defendant; 2) whether the defendant committed the offense while under du-
ress or coercion; 3) defendant's inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of the offense at the
time of its commission; 4) defendant's role in the offense; 5) victim's participation in the of-
fense; 6) defendant's lack of prior criminal conduct; and 7) the unlikelihood that defendant will
commit crime in the future. Id. at 1232-37.
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to guide the sentencing process,3 1 most death penalty statutes prior to 1972
continued to delegate broad discretion to the sentencing authority.
32
Dissatisfaction with broad jury sentencing discretion eventually developed
because state death penalty statutes allowed juries to impose the death pen-
alty in an arbitrary and capricious manner.33 However, the constitutional
status of discretionary capital punishment sentencing drastically changed in
1972. 34 At that time, the Supreme Court held in Furman v. Georgia35 that
the "untrammeled discretion" of the sentencing authority created a substan-
tial risk that the imposition of the death penalty would occur in an inconsis-
tent and arbitrary manner, and would thus violate a capital offender's
constitutional rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 36 Fol-
lowing Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court focused on how much statu-
tory guidance and limitation should be placed upon the sentencing authority
to prevent inconsistent sentencing without depriving the capital offender of
individualized sentencing.37
In Mills v. Maryland,38 the Court re-examined the discretion of the sen-
tencing authority to determine whether the sentencing instructions permit-
ted the jury to impose the death penalty in a fair and consistent manner.39
In March 1985, a Maryland jury tried and convicted Ralph Mills for the first
31. Id. at 1133.
32. Id.
33. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 248, n.11 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
"[Wihere discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of
whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
34. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 598 (1978).
35. 408 U.S. 238, 248-49 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 248-49; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188. In a concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia,
Justice White maintained that "the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for
the most atrocious crimes and ... there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases
in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Furman, 408 U.S. at 313
(White, J., concurring).
37. Individualized sentencing requires the sentencing authority to consider all relevant
aspects of the character of the offender and the nature of the offense not included in a death
penalty statute. In particular, the sentencing authority must take into consideration any miti-
gating circumstance not outlined in the state statute. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633,
637 (1977) ("[lIt is essential that the capital-sentencing decision allow for consideration of
whatever mitigating circumstances may be relevant to either the particular offender or the
particular offense."); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. Forty years earlier, the Supreme Court held
that "[flor the determination of sentences, justice generally requires ... that there be taken into
account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the
offender." Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937).
38. 108 S. Ct. 1860 (1988).
39. Id. at 1863. The Court split five to four in favor of remanding the case for resentenc-
ing. Id. at 1870. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, White, and Stevens represented the
1989]
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degree murder of his cellmate. 4° The jury determined that Mills had stabbed
Paul Brown six times in the chest and thirty-nine times in the back while the
two shared a cell at a Maryland correctional institution.4' During the sen-
tencing phase, the Maryland Rules42 required the sentencing authority to
complete a verdict form4 3 and to list the aggravating and/or mitigating cir-
cumstances that it found.44 The same jury"5 found that the state had proven
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a statutory aggravating circum-
stance: Mills " 'committed the murder at a time when he was confined in a
correctional institution.' "46 The jury, however, marked "no" beside each
listed mitigating circumstance. 47 The Maryland death penalty statute also
required the sentencing authority to weigh any proven aggravating circum-
stance(s) against any mitigating circumstance(s). 4 ' Because there was no
mitigating circumstance to weigh against the aggravating circumstance, the
jury imposed the death penalty.49
The majority in Mills v. Maryland concluded that the jury instructions
were ambiguous.5" One possible interpretation would result in unconstitu-
majority. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy dissented. Id.
at 1872.
40. Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33, 38, 527 A.2d 3, 5 (1987), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 1860 (1988).
41. Id. at 39, 527 A.2d at 5.
42. MD. RULE PROC. 772A.
43. Id. The verdict form was entitled "Findings and Sentence Determination." The com-
pleted verdict form is printed in the Appendix of the Mills v. Maryland decision. Mills, 108 S.
Ct. at 1870-72. Rule 772A was rescinded and replaced by Maryland Rules of Procedure 4-
343. The revised form is similar to the former, and was in effect at the time of petitioner's trial.
However, petitioner raised no objection to the use of the outdated form. Mills, 108 S. Ct. at
1863 n.2.
44. See Appendix of the Mills v. Maryland decision for a listing of aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances considered. Mills, 108 S. Ct. at 1870-72.
45. The current Maryland death penalty statute provides for a bifurcated trial. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 413(a) (1987). This means that after a judge or jury returns a guilty verdict, a
sentencing hearing convenes. There are three ways a sentencing hearing may proceed. The
jury that determined the defendant's guilt may make the sentencing determination. Id.
§ 413(b)(1). Alternatively, the court may impanel a new jury for the sentencing hearing for
the following reasons: i) the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; ii) the defendant
was convicted after a trial before the court sitting without a jury; iii) the jury that determined
the defendant's guilt has been discharged by the court for good cause; or iv) review of the
original sentence of death by a court of competent jurisdiction has resulted in a remand for
resentencing. Id. § 413(b)(2)(i)-(iv). Finally, if the jury sentencing proceeding is waived by the
defendant, the court alone may determine the sentence. Id. § 413(b)(3).
46. Mills, 108 S. Ct. at 1863.
47. Id.
48. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(h)(1).
49. Mills, 108 S.Ct. at 1863.
50. See id. at 1867. Section II of the verdict form instructed the jury to mark each answer
to the existence of mitigating circumstances with "yes" or "no." It was clear that the jury
could not mark "yes" without unanimity. However, neither the verdict form nor the judge's
[Vol. 38:907
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tionally precluding the jury from considering all mitigating circumstances
when imposing Mills' death sentence."' The majority argued that if the re-
viewing court was unable to determine whether the jury rested its verdict on
the unconstitutional or constitutional ground, the death sentence must be
vacated.52 The majority ruled that the possibility remained that the jury
misinterpreted the judge's instructions resulting in an unconstitutional impo-
sition of the death penalty, and therefore vacated the judgment of the Mary-
land Court of Appeals.53
The dissent in Mills v. Maryland argued that the jury instructions allowed
for one interpretation: that the jury unanimously found that no mitigating
circumstances existed.54 The dissent maintained that a reasonable juror
could have understood the charge as meaning only this interpretation. The
dissent, therefore, was in favor of affirming the court of appeals' judgment.55
This Note examines the law prior to the Mills v. Maryland decision, dem-
onstrating how the Supreme Court has wrestled with the conflict between a
sentencing authority's discretion and the defendant's right to individualized
sentencing. In addition, this Note traces the development of the Maryland
death penalty statute, the state statute that the Supreme Court interpreted in
Mills. This Note shows how Maryland has endeavored to refine its capital
punishment statute to comply with constitutional standards. The Note then
takes a closer look at the Mills decision by discussing the rationale behind
the majority and dissenting opinions. This Note agrees with the Mills major-
ity, because the majority tried to provide further protection to the capital
offender by requiring reliability in the imposition of death sentences. How-
ever, this Note takes the approach that the Mills opinion is limited to its
facts, namely that death sentences based on faulty sentencing instructions
must be vacated.
I. THE SHAPING OF A CAPITAL PUNISHMENT STATUTE
A. Unbridled Jury Discretion in the Twentieth Century
Prior to 1972, nearly all death penalty statutes gave the sentencing author-
ity, either a judge or jury,5 6 broad discretion in determining the appropriate
instructions dispelled the probable inference that "no" is the opposite of "yes" and therefore
the appropriate answer to reflect an inability to answer the question in the affirmative. Id.
51. Id. at 1866.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1870.
54. Id. at 1873 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
55. Id.
56. All states with death penalty statutes now require bifurcated trial and sentencing pro-
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punishment, death or imprisonment, in capital cases.57 In McGautha v. Cal-
ifornia, 5 the Supreme Court held that the lack of sentencing guidelines con-
trolling the discretion of capital juries did not offend the United States
Constitution's fourteenth amendment due process clause.59 The rationale
behind granting broad discretion to sentencing authorities was that state leg-
islatures could not properly identify, before the fact, those characteristics of
criminal homicides and convicted murderers which could justify imposing
the death penalty.' Correspondingly, the legislatures failed to express those
characteristics in a manner which a sentencing authority could interpret and
apply in a fair and consistent fashion.6' The Court determined that an at-
tempt to categorize all relevant factors that a sentencing authority should
consider would be futile, because the list would never be complete and would
inhibit rather than expand the scope of consideration.62
Although these statutes gave the sentencing authority broad discretion,
none of the death penalty statutes authorized mandatory death penalties.63
The Supreme Court later noted, in Woodson v. North Carolina,64 that
mandatory death penalty statutes in the United States had proven unsatis-
factory partly because jurors often refused to return a guilty verdict against
those whom the government had proven guilty of murder if a death sentence
would automatically result.65 Jury determinations and legislative enact-
ments indicated the overriding concern of the American public that auto-
matic death sentences were unduly harsh and unworkably rigid.66 Indeed,
the attitude in the United States moved so far "from a mandatory system
that the imposition of capital punishment frequently had become arbitrary
and capricious."67 To break away from the rigors of a mandatory sentenc-
ing system, the courts and legislatures went to the other extreme by commit-
ceedings. The sentencing authority, either a judge, judges, or jury, varies according to state
statute. See Special Project, supra note 11, at 1237-38.
57. Id. at 1133.
58. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 204.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 208.
63. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 597-98 (1978).
64. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
65. 1d. at 293. In Winston v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
[t]he hardship of punishing with death every crime coming within the definition of
murder at common law, and the reluctance of jurors to concur in a capital convic-
tion, have induced American legislatures, in modern times, to allow some cases of
murder to be punished by imprisonment, instead of by death.
172 U.S. 303, 310 (1899).
66. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293.
67. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111 (1982).
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ting the use of the death penalty to the absolute discretion of juries.68
B. Unbridled Sentencing Discretion Ruled Unconstitutional
In 1972, however, the Supreme Court's view on the sentencing procedure
for capital punishment changed abruptly with the landmark decision in
Furman v. Georgia.69 In Furman, the Supreme Court held that the eighth
and fourteenth amendments' prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment precluded imposing the death penalty under the Georgia and Texas
capital punishment statutes,70 because the broad sentencing discretion af-
forded in those statutes allowed for the arbitrary and capricious imposition
of the death penalty. 7' Ironically, what the Supreme Court had allowed in
McGautha v. California under the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause was then rendered unconstitutional in Furman, under the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. 7' The Furman decision left state legislatures with
the difficult task of determining what type of death penalty statute would
pass constitutional muster. The legal community perceived the Furman
Court as disapproving death penalty statutes that conferred any discretion
upon the sentencing authority.73
68. Id.
69. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
70. Id. at 239-40. The Furman decision rejected the Court's argument in McGautha v.
California that unrestricted jury discretion did not lead to unconstitutional arbitrariness in
sentencing. One commentator argued that the Supreme Court's abrupt departure from Mc-
Gautha was based on the two different types of constitutional analyses the Court employed. In
McGautha, the Court focused on the due process analysis to support its conclusion. In
Furman, however, the Court scrutinized the Georgia and Texas death penalty statutes in light
of the eighth amendment of the Constitution. See Comment, Constitutional Criminal Law-The
Role of Mitigating Circumstances in Considering the Death Penalty, 53 TUL. L. REV. 608, 611
n.24 (1979); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 599 (1978) ("[Wjhat had been approved
under the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment in McGautha became im-
permissible under the [e]ighth and [f]ourteenth [a]mendments by virtue of the judgment in
Furman. ").
71. Combs, supra note 11, at 4. Many people convicted of capital offenses were as unscru-
pulous as the petitioners in the Furman case, yet those in Furman were "among a capriciously
selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed."
Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Furman Court held the Texas and
Georgia statutes "unconstitutional, not because they conferred discretion upon the sentencing
authority, but because the discretion conferred was 'standardless.' " Rockwell v. Superior
Court of Ventura County, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 446, 556 P.2d 1101, 1117, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650, 666
(1977) (Clark, J., concurring).
72. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 599. One commentator suggested that the uncertainty emanating
from the Supreme Court decisions regarding capital punishment reflected the Court's attempt
to maintain control over the development of procedural safeguards. See Combs, supra note 11,
at 38-41; Special Project, supra note 11, at 1131 n.5.
73. Rockwell, 18 Cal. 3d at 446, 556 P.2d at 1117, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 666. The problem
with the Furman decision was that, although it was a five to four decision, each justice filed an
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The Furman Court specifically invalidated two death penalty statutes.74
However, Furman effectively invalidated thirty-nine of the forty state death
penalty statutes in effect at that time.75 Moreover, the judgment in Furman
removed the death sentences previously imposed on over 600 persons.7 6 In
the wake of Furman, state legislatures drafted new death penalty statutes.
The theme underlying these new state statutes was control of the discretion
of the sentencing authority." Ten states adopted mandatory death penalties
for a limited category of specific offenses in an effort to eliminate all sentenc-
ing discretion in capital cases. 78 Twenty-five state statutes adopted a modi-
fied version of the Model Penal Code's capital sentencing scheme.79 These
statutes provided guided sentencing discretion through the use of bifurcated
individual opinion. The majority reversed the judgments sustaining the death penalties. Two
justices, Brennan and Marshall, concluded that capital punishment is unconstitutional per se
according to the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305-6 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("[D]eath stands condemned as fatally offensive to human dignity."); id. at 360-61
(Marshall, J., concurring) ("[lilt is morally unacceptable to the people of the United States at
this time in their history."). Three justices disagreed that capital punishment is unconstitu-
tional per se, but voted to reverse on procedural grounds. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 599; Combs,
supra note 11, at 5. Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White concluded that discretionary sen-
tencing, unguided by legislatively defined standards, violated the eighth amendment, Lockett,
438 U.S. at 599, because, it was "pregnant with discrimination," Furman, 408 U.S. at 257
(Douglas, J., concurring), because it permitted the death penalty to be "wantonly" and "freak-
ishly" imposed, id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring), and because it imposed the death penalty
with "great infrequency" and "that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many in which it is not." Id. at 313 (White, J., concur-
ring); see Lockett, 438 U.S. at 599.
74. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40. Two cases before the Court dealt with the Georgia stat-
ute; one dealt with the Texas statute. Id. at 239. The Court struck down the Georgia death
penalty statute as it applied to murder, GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971) (effective
prior to July 1, 1969), and the death penalty provision applicable to rape, GA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-1302 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969). Id. The Texas case involved a rape
conviction. The Court invalidated the applicable provision accordingly. Id. (TEX. PENAL
CODE, art. 1189 (1961)).
75. Note, State v. Wilson: The Improper Use of Prosecutorial Discretion in Capital Punish-
ment Cases, 63 N.C.L. REV. 1136, 1136 n.5 (1985). While the constitutionality of mandatory
death penalty statutes remained undecided, only the Rhode Island statute, which permitted a
mandatory death penalty sentence for a life term prisoner convicted of murder, remained in
effect after Furman. Id. But see Comment, The Furman Case.: What Life is Left in the Death
Penalty, 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 651, 652 n.3 (1973) (four state statutes with mandatory death
penalties were unaffected by Furman).
76. Furman, 408 U.S. at 417.
77. Combs, supra note 11, at 5.
78. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 600 & n.8 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 313 (1976) (citing State Capital Punishment Statutes Enacted Subsequent to Furman
v. Georgia, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE PAMPHLET 17-22 (June 19, 1974));
Rockwell v. Superior Court of Ventura County, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 446-48, 556 P.2d 1101, 1116-
18, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650, 665-67 (1977).
79. Special Project, supra note 11, at 1219.
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trials, the consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and
appellate review."0 Guided discretion provided a method of balancing the
broad discretion endowed on the sentencing authority prior to Furman and
the mandatory death penalty statutes that some states enacted subsequent to
Furman."'
C. Mandatory Death Penalty Ruled Unconstitutional
In 1976, the Supreme Court, in Woodson v. North Carolina,"2 held
mandatory death penalty statutes for first degree murder unconstitutional.
8 3
Those state legislatures that had interpreted Furman v. Georgia to require a
mandatory death penalty were compelled to return to the drawing board.
Prior to Furman, the North Carolina death penalty statute provided for un-
bridled jury discretion in the determination of whether to impose the death
penalty.8 4 After Furman, the North Carolina Supreme Court held its discre-
tionary death penalty statute unconstitutional in State v. Waddell, 5 and the
North Carolina General Assembly enacted a mandatory death penalty stat-
ute to comply with Furman. 86 Pursuant to the revised statute, the Woodson
defendants were convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. 7
In Woodson, the Court considered for the first time the constitutionality of a
mandatory death penalty statute.88 After presenting a detailed history of the
mandatory death penalty, the Court concluded that jurors, and society as a
whole, have an aversion to automatic death sentences.89 The Court main-
tained that the mandatory death penalty statutes enacted after Furman did
not reflect a renewed societal acceptance of mandatory death sentencing, but
80. See Combs, supra note 11, at 5. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 600. These states attempted
to enact statutes that simultaneously allowed for the individual assessment of each convicted
capital offender and complied with Furman by providing guidelines to the sentencing authority
when determining whether to impose death or imprisonment.
81. See Comment, supra note 70, at 612.
82. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). The case involved four men convicted of murder during an
armed robbery. Woodson was in the getaway car when the robbery and murder occurred.
The jury found all four men guilty on all charges, and as required by statute, sentenced them to
death. Id. at 282-84.
83. Id. at 305. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 638 (1977); Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976).
84. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 285.
85. 282 N.C. 431, 447, 194 S.E.2d 19, 30 (1973). The Supreme Court of North Carolina
interpreted the Furman decision to mean that permitting either a judge or a jury to impose the
death penalty as a matter of its discretion violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Id.
at 439, 194 S.E.2d at 25.
86. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1975)).
87. Id. at 282-83.
88. Id. at 287.
89. Id. at 295.
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rather constituted an attempt by state legislatures to comply with Furman's
ambiguous holding.9" The Court invalidated mandatory death sentences be-
cause they conflicted with contemporary standards of decency and thus vio-
lated the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. 9 Further, the Court determined that such statutes failed to
meet Furman's basic requirement that objective standards, which guide, reg-
ularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence
of death, must replace broad sentencing discretion.92 Finally, the Court held
that mandatory death penalty statutes failed to allow complete consideration
of the character of the offender and the nature of the offense.93 As a result,




Along with Woodson v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court ruled on four
other cases involving the imposition of capital punishment.95 In Roberts v.
Louisiana,96 the Court invalidated Louisiana's mandatory death penalty
statute based on the Woodson reasoning.97 However, the Supreme Court
upheld the Georgia, Texas, and Florida capital punishment statutes, 98 find-
ing that they sufficiently directed the sentencing authority so as to prevent
the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. 99 The Court
90. Id. at 298.
91. Id. at 301.
92. Id. at 303.
93. Id. at 303-04.
94. Id. at 305.
95. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
96. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
97. Id. at 331-334. The Louisiana statute in Roberts required mandatory death sentences
for those convicted of first degree murder, aggravated rape, aggravated kidnaping, or treason.
The jury could not add any qualification or recommendation to the verdict. Id. at 331. The
Court stated that "[t]he constitutional vice of mandatory death sentence statutes - lack of focus
on the circumstances of the particular offense and the character and propensities of the of-
fender - is not resolved by Louisiana's limitations of first-degree murder to various categories
of killings." Id. at 333. Louisiana's mandatory death penalty statute failed "to comply with
Furman's requirement that standardless jury discretion be replaced by procedures that safe-
guard against arbitrary and capricious imposition of death sentences." Id. at 334.
98. See Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259-60; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07; Jurek, 428 U.S. 262.
99. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252-53; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 220-24; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 273-74. In
Gregg, the Supreme Court upheld the Georgia death penalty statute due to the jury's finding of
one of the aggravating circumstances listed in the statute and the direction to the jury to
consider "any mitigating circumstances." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197.
In Proffitt, the Supreme Court upheld the Florida death penalty statute, which the Court
acknowledged was similar to the Georgia statute upheld in Gregg, except that in Florida, the
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determined that a death penalty statute was constitutional if the statute pro-
vided for individualized sentencing,'0° which, although not a constitutional
imperative, reflected enlightened policy that is fundamental to complying
with the eighth amendment's respect for human dignity.' °
According to the Court, ensuring individualized sentencing in a death
penalty statute allowed the sentencing authority to consider mitigating, as
well as aggravating circumstances.' °2 The Court reasoned that a jury must
be allowed to consider all relevant evidence before deciding if the death pen-
alty should or should not be imposed."°3 The Court maintained that consid-
eration of statutory aggravating circumstances adequately limits and directs
the jury, thereby reducing the risk of the arbitrary and capricious imposition
of the death penalty."° 4 Simultaneously, requiring the jury to consider any
relevant mitigating factors "maintain[s] the essential link with contemporary
community values" regarding when the imposition of capital punishment is
appropriate. 0 5
E. Consideration of All Mitigating Factors is Required
In Lockett v. Ohio, 10 6 the Court maintained that a sentencing authority
trial judge is the sentencing authority. Proffitt. 428 U.S. at 252. The Florida statute required
the trial judge to weigh eight aggravating circumstances against seven mitigating circum-
stances in determining whether to impose the death penalty. This method, the Court main-
tained, forced the judge to consider the character of the offender and the circumstances of the
crime. Id. at 251.
In Jurek, the Court upheld the Texas death penalty statute although it did not explicitly
speak of mitigating circumstances. The Court held that requiring the jury to find an aggravat-
ing circumstance before imposing death forced the jury to consider the particularized nature of
the crime and therefore encompassed other mitigating factors as well. Jurek 428 U.S. at 273.
The Texas statute accomplished this not by listing statutory aggravating circumstances, but
rather by narrowing the categories of murders for which a death sentence could be imposed.
Id. at 270.
100. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 271; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05. See supra note 37.
101. See supra note 37; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion).
102. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 271.
But a sentencing system that allowed the jury to consider only aggravating circum-
stances would almost certainly fall short of providing the individualized sentencing
determination that we today have held in Woodson v. North Carolina . . . to be re-
quired by the eighth and fourteenth amendments .... Thus, in order to meet the
requirement of the eighth and fourteenth amendments, a capital-sentencing system
must allow the sentencing authority to consider mitigating circumstances.
Id. For an explanation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, see supra note 30.
103. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 271.
104. See Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33, 82, 527 A.2d 3, 27 (1987), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 1860
(1988) (McAuliffe, J., dissenting) (commenting on the Jurek, Proffitt, and Gregg decisions).
105. Id.
106. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). An Ohio court convicted Sandra Lockett of aggravated murder
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must consider any and all relevant mitigating factors 117 that the defendant
offered.10 8 Commentators have suggested that the "unlimited mitigation"
theory promoted in Lockett represents a return to the period of unguided
jury discretion that existed before Furman. 109 However, Lockett and
Furman can be reconciled in that Lockett returned discretion to the jury
only with regard to mitigating circumstances." 0 Thus, after Lockett, consti-
tutionally valid death penalty statutes must carefully guide the jury's consid-
eration of aggravating circumstances, yet allow the jury broad discretion to
consider mitigating factors. The justification for this apparent imbalance
rests on the perception that erroneous decisions not to impose the death pen-
alty are acceptable, while errors imposing it are not." 1
II. MILLS V. MAR YLAND: THE SUPREME COURT ADHERES TO THE
ARBITRARY IMPOSITION OF MERCY
A. Development of the Maryland Death Penalty Statute
The Maryland death penalty statute at issue in the Mills decision was the
product of the Maryland General Assembly's careful drafting and revising in
for her participation in the robbery of a pawn shop. Lockett allegedly drove the getaway
vehicle. Id. at 589-90.
107. The Lockett Court's definition of relevant mitigating evidence was any aspect of the
defendant's character or the nature of the offense. Id. at 604. In California v. Brown, the
Court held that "mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or
public feeling" is not mitigating evidence. 479 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1987).
108. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. The Court struck down the Ohio death penalty statute
because it allowed for the consideration of only three mitigating factors. Id. at 608. The three
factors were:
1) the victim of the offense induced or facilitated [the offense];
2) it is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that
the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation; and
3) the offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or mental defi-
ciency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity.
Id. at 607 (citing OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (1975)). The Court concluded that
once the sentencing authority established the absence of these three mitigating circumstances,
the statute mandated the death penalty. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608. The statute, however, did
not provide for the consideration of the defendant's intent, the defendant's comparatively mi-
nor role in the offense, or the defendant's age. Id. The Court held that the death penalty
statute was incompatible with the eighth and fourteenth amendments because it provided for
too limited a range of mitigating circumstances. Id. By holding as unconstitutional a state
statute that limits the number of possible mitigating circumstances, "Lockett represents an
effort by the Court to further individualize the sentencing procedure in capital cases." Combs,
supra note 11, at 34.
109. Comment, Dark Years on Death Row: Guiding Sentencer Discretion After Zant, Bar-
clay & Harris, 17 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 689, 699 (1984) (the "Furman-Lockett Paradox").
110. Id.
111. Id. This view of Lockett thus holds Furman to preclude the arbitrary and capricious
imposition of death, not of mercy. Id.
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compliance with previous Supreme Court decisions. Originally, Maryland's
death penalty statute endowed the sentencing authority with unbridled dis-
cretion to impose capital punishment unless the jury specified "without capi-
tal punishment" in its verdict.' 12 The Maryland Court of Appeals, in
response to Furman, declared Maryland's discretionary death penalty stat-
ute unconstitutional." 3 The Maryland court interpreted Furman, as did
many state courts,1 14 to mean that the non-mandatory imposition of the
death penalty was unconstitutional.'" Accordingly, the Maryland General
Assembly revised its death penalty statute in 1975. The statute required the
automatic imposition of capital punishment for narrowly defined first degree
murder convictions."
16
After the Woodson decision, the Maryland Court of Appeals followed suit
by holding Maryland's mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional.
1 7
Correspondingly, the Maryland General Assembly revised the death penalty
statute. The new capital punishment statute1 18 provided for bifurcated pro-
ceedings to determine separately guilt from sentencing;' 19 a requisite finding
of at least one aggravating circumstance;120 a list of eight aggravating cir-
cumstances1 21 to be weighed against 22 seven specific mitigating factors; 23
112. Note, infra note 116, at 876 n.10 (citing MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 413 (1971)(re-
pealed 1975)).
Every person convicted of murder in the first degree, his or her aiders, abettors and
counsellors, shall suffer death or undergo a confinement in the penitentiary of the
[S]tate for the period of their natural life, in the discretion of the court before whom
such person may be tried; provided, however, that the jury in a murder case who
render [sic] a verdict of murder in the first degree, may add thereto the words "with-
out capital punishment," in which case the sentence of the court shall be imprison-
ment for life ....
Id.
113. Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175, 184, 297 A.2d 696, 701 (1972).
114. See supra note 78.
115. Bartholomey, 267 Md. at 184, 297 A.2d at 701; Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33, 81, 527
A.2d 3, 26 (1987) (McAuliffe, J., dissenting) ("Unfortunately, we read Furman as holding 'that
the death penalty is unconstitutional when its imposition is not mandatory.' "), vacated, 108 S.
Ct. 1860 (1988).
116. Note, Tichnell v. State - Maryland's Death Penalty. The Need for Reform, 42 MD. L.
REV. 875, 877 (1983) (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1976) (repealed 1978)).
117. Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466, 471-73, 365 A.2d 545, 548-49 (1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 918 (1977). The court interpreted the Maryland statute as lacking "any clear or
precise guidelines enabling the sentencing authority to focus [upon] and consider particular-
ized mitigating factors." Id. at 472-73, 365 A.2d at 549.
118. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (Supp. 1980).
119. Id. § 413(a).
120. Id. § 413(d), (f).
121. These same eight aggravating circumstances were listed in the 1975 and 1987 laws but
the wording was somewhat different. See, Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33, 82, 527 A.2d 3, 27 (1987)
(McAuliffe, J., dissenting). The aggravating circumstances were: i) the defendant committed
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and mandatory appellate review.' 24 Two days after the revised Maryland
the murder at a time when he was confined or under sentence of confinement to any correc-
tional institution in this State; ii) the defendant committed the murder in furtherance of an
attempt to escape from or evade the lawful custody, arrest, or detention of or by a law enforce-
ment officer, correctional officer, or guard; iii) the victim was a hostage taken or attempted to
be taken in the course of a kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap; iv) the victim was a child
abducted in violation of section 2 of this article; v) the defendant committed the murder pursu-
ant to an agreement or contract to commit the murder for pecuniary gain; vi) at the time of the
murder, the defendant was under a sentence of life imprisonment; vii) the defendant commit-
ted more than one offense of murder in the first degree arising out of the same or separate
incidents; and viii) the defendant committed the murder while committing or attempting to
commit robbery. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d) (1975).
The Maryland General Assembly kept the eight aggravating circumstances and included
two additional aggravating circumstances upon repeal of the 1975 law: i) the victim was a law
enforcement officer who was murdered while in the performance of his duties, and ii) the
defendant engaged or employed another person to commit the murder and the murder was
committed pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of remuner-
ation. Provision (viii) above has added the crimes of arson, rape or sexual offense in the first
degree to the list. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d) (1987).
122. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(h).
123. Id. § 413(g)(l)-(7). The mitigating circumstances are: 1) the defendant has not previ-
ously (i) been found guilty of a crime of violence, (ii) entered a plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere to a charge of a crime of violence; or (iii) had a judgment of probation on stay of entry
of judgment entered on a charge of a crime of violence. A "crime of violence" means abduc-
tion, arson, escape, kidnapping, manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter, mayhem,
murder, robbery, or rape or sexual offense in the first or second degree, or an attempt to
commit any of these offenses, or the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or another
crime of violence; 2) the victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to
the act which caused the victim's death; 3) the defendant acted under substantial duress, domi-
nation or provocation of another person, but not so substantial as to constitute a complete
defense to the prosecution; 4) the murder was committed while the capacity of the defendant
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law was substantially impaired as a result of mental incapacity, mental disorder or emo-
tional disturbance; 5) the youthful age of the defendant at the time of the crime; 6) the act of
the defendant was not the sole proximate cause of the victim's death; 7) it is unlikely that the
defendant will engage in further criminal activity that would constitute a continuing threat to
society. Id.
124. Id. § 414(a). The Supreme Court has never declared that the Constitution required
appellate review of death sentences. Special Project, supra note I1, at 1194. However, several
of the Court's decisions suggested that appellate review is "an important additional safeguard"
in a capital sentencing scheme. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opin-
ion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198, 206 (1976); see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,
253, 258-60 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976)
(plurality opinion); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335 (1976) (plurality opinion).
The basis for requiring appellate review of death sentences stems from the nature of the
punishment. Due to the unique and final nature of the death penalty, as compared with other
forms of punishment, the Court has recognized "a corresponding difference in the need for
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case."
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305; see Special Project, supra note 11, at 1192-98.
Every state death penalty statute includes automatic appellate review. Id. at 1241. There
are essentially three components of appellate review, although each state statute varies as to
which components are implemented. The three components are: a comparative proportional-
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death penalty statute became effective,125 the Supreme Court decided Lock-
ett v. Ohio. The Maryland legislature responded to Lockett by including an
eighth mitigating circumstance, a catch-all provision that allowed the sen-
tencing authority to consider any relevant mitigating factor.
1 26
B. Mills v. State
In 1985, a Maryland state court jury sentenced Ralph Mills to death for
killing his cellmate.' 27 Mills appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland,
arguing that the Maryland death penalty statute, as applied to him, was un-
constitutionally mandatory. 28 Mills maintained that the statute required
the jury to impose the death penalty if it unanimously found that an aggra-
vating circumstance existed, but could not agree unanimously on the exist-
ence of a mitigating circumstance.' 2 9 If the jury could not agree
unanimously on the existence of any one mitigating circumstance, the statute
precluded the jury from considering any relevant mitigating factors.' 3 ' Such
ity review of how defendant's sentence compares with sentences given to defendants convicted
of similar crimes, id. at 1189-90; a procedural review of whether the sentencing authority
applied the statutory guidelines properly, id. at 1190-91; and a narrowing function, which
allows the reviewing court to narrow a potentially broad or vague guideline to within constitu-
tionally permissible bounds, id. at 1191.
125. Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33, 82-83, 527 A.2d 3, 27 (1987), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 1860
(1988).
126. Id. at 83, 527 A.2d at 27. The legislature enacted Chapter 521 of the Laws of 1979 to
add this eighth mitigating circumstance: "8) Any other facts which the jury or the court
specifically sets forth in writing that it finds as mitigating circumstances in this case." MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (g)(8) (1987).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland subsequently ruled that the capital sentencing proce-
dures in Sections 412-414 of Article 27 of the Maryland Code comply with the United States
Supreme Court guidelines. Tichnell v. State, 297 Md. 432, 447-48, 468 A.2d 1, 8-10 (1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 993 (1984). The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the Maryland
statute complied with the three methods of guiding the discretion of the sentencing authority:
by providing for a bifurcated trial procedure; by imposing the death penalty only in cases
where the sentencing authority found at least one aggravating circumstance, which outweighed
any existing mitigating circumstance(s); and by requiring an automatic appellate review of all
death sentences. Id. at 448-49, 468 A.2d at 9-10.
The Mills Court did not discuss whether the Maryland death penalty statute itself was con-
stitutional. Rather, the Court addressed whether the trial court properly instructed the jury so
as to allow it to consider the statutory provisions in a constitutional manner. Mills v. Mary-
land, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 1863 (1988).
127. Mills, 310 Md. at 39, 527 A.2d at 5-6.
128. Id. at 49, 527 A.2d at 10-11.
129. Mills v. Maryland, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 1864 (1988). Essentially, if one, some, or all of the
jurors believed a mitigating circumstance existed, but not all twelve. agreed as to the same
mitigating factor, no mitigating circumstance would be considered. Mills, 310 Md. at 89, 527
A.2d at 30 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
130. Mills, 108 S. Ct. at 1866. Mills' defense counsel attempted to convince the jury that
four mitigating circumstances existed, namely: petitioner's relative youth (20 years old); his
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an effect, Mills argued, directly violated the Lockett rule.' 3 '
The court of appeals declared that the instructions to the jury were
clear.' 32 The jurors were required to agree unanimously both to the exist-
ence or absence of any mitigating factors.' 3 3 The court determined that a
"no" marked next to a mitigating circumstance listed on the verdict form
represented the jury's unanimous decision of the absence of any mitigating
factors.' 34 Consequently, the court affirmed Mills' conviction.1
35
The dissenting opinion in the court of appeals sharply disagreed with the
majority's views. 136 The dissent argued that both the judge's and verdict
form's instructions allowed the jury reasonably to conclude that a "no"
marked on the form beside a mitigating circumstance represented the jury's
inability to agree unanimously on the existence of the mitigating circum-
stance. It did not represent the jury's unanimous decision that the mitigat-
ing circumstance did not exist. 13' Thus, the dissent maintained that the
ambiguous nature of the instructions unconstitutionally precluded the jury
from considering any mitigating factor during the sentencing
determination.1
38
mental infirmity; his lack of future dangerousness; and the state's failure to attempt to rehabili-
tate him while he was incarcerated. Id. at 1863.
131. Id. at 1866; see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) ("[T]he sentencer [may] not
be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death.").
132. Mills, 310 Md. at 58, 527 A.2d at 15.
133. Id.
134. Id. Moreover, common law and Maryland statutory law both required jury unanim-
ity on all critical issues, id., and the presence or absence of an aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstance, as well as weighing these circumstances against each other, constituted "ultimate
issues," according to the Court. Id. at 60, 527 A.2d at 16.
135. Id. at 63, 527 A.2d at 17.
136. Mills v. Maryland, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 1864 (1988). Judge McAuliffe maintained that
had the verdict form stated " 'we unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the follow-
ing aggravating circumstance(s) exist,' " followed by a list of aggravating circumstance(s), the
jury would have had no difficulty in marking only those aggravating circumstance(s) that they
unanimously found to exist. Mills, 310 Md. at 77, 527 A.2d at 24 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
Moreover, this language, if used on the form, would have prevented the jury from marking,
either with yes or no, those circumstances about which they disagreed. Id. Judge McAuliffe
further maintained that the Maryland General Assembly did not intend to require a unani-
mous finding as to an historic fact (a fact which leads up to the determination of any ultimate
issue essential to the verdict, namely the non-existence of a mitigating circumstance). Id. at
84, 527 A.2d at 28.




C Mills v. Maryland
In an effort to resolve whether the jury's interpretation of the sentencing
instructions as applied to Mills was unconstitutionally mandatory,1 39 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari." The majority"' in Mills v. Maryland
analyzed whether a reasonable jury would have understood the sentencing
instructions from the trial judge and the verdict form according to Mills'
interpretation 42 or the court of appeals' interpretation. 43 The Court main-
tained that it would uphold the death sentence only if it could rule out Mills'
interpretation of the jury instructions.'"
The Court pointed out several reasons why it could not reject Mills' inter-
pretation and instead exclusively adopt the court of appeals' analysis. First,
neither the judge nor the verdict form instructed the jury that, in the case of
the inability to agree unanimously, it could leave an answer blank.' 45 The
Court found this lack of instruction impermissible because it forced the jury
to answer "no" to a mitigating factor, although one or more jurors found
that the factor existed.' 46 Furthermore, by not instructing the jury that it
could leave an answer blank, the Court determined that the instructions pos-
139. Mills, 108 S. Ct. at 1863.
140. 108 S. Ct. 484 (1988). The Court noted that generally a reviewing court must set
aside a verdict if the court is uncertain whether that verdict possibly rested on an unconstitu-
tional ground. Mills, 108 S. Ct. at 1866; see, e.g., Yates v. United States, 353 U.S. 298, 312
(1957); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-68 (1931). This rule has particular force
when capital punishment is involved. The Supreme Court requires even greater certainty that
the jury's conclusions rested on proper grounds when it reviews death sentences. Mills, 108 S.
Ct. at 1866; see, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) ("[T]he risk that the death
penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty . . . is
unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the [e]ighth and [flourteenth
(a]mendments[.]"); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 752 (1948) ("That reasonable men
might derive a meaning from the instructions given other than the proper meaning of § 567 is
probable. In death cases doubts such as those presented here should be resolved in favor of the
accused.").
141. Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the Court. Justices Brennan, Marshall,
White, and Stevens joined. Justices Brennan and White filed concurring opinions. Justice
Brennan maintained that the death penalty in all circumstances constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Mills, 108 S. Ct. at 1872.
142. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
143. Mills, 108 S. Ct. at 1866; see Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1985) ("The
question ... is not what the State Supreme Court declares the meaning of the charge to be, but
rather what a reasonable juror could have understood the charge as meaning") (citing Sand-
strom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 516-17 (1979) (which held that the state court "is not the
final authority on the interpretation which a jury could have given the instruction.").
144. Mills, 108 S. Ct. at 1867.
145. Id. at 1867-68. Rather, the probable inference for the jurors was that " 'no' is the
opposite of 'yes' and therefore the appropriate answer to reflect an inability to answer a ques-
tion in the affirmative." Id. at 1867.
146. Id. at 1868.
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sibly confused the jury as to how it should weigh any mitigating circum-
stances against the aggravating circumstances. 4 7 Moreover, the majority
found it significant that the appellate court majority's reading of the statute
completely astonished the dissenting judge of the court of appeals. The
Court noted that the dissenting appellate judge claimed that the majority's
appellate interpretation "appear[ed] out of the blue after nearly ten years of
extensive litigation involving this statute."14' Finally, the Supreme Court
regarded the court of appeals' adoption 149 of a new verdict form' 50 as addi-
tional evidence illustrating the ambiguous nature of the older form's instruc-
tions. " 1 The Court held that there was a "substantial probability" that
reasonable jurors would have been precluded from considering any or all
mitigating evidence.' 52 Because it could not dismiss the possibility of the
verdict resting on an improper ground, the Court ruled that the imposition
of the death penalty was unconstitutional.1
5 3
The Court's dissenting opinion' 5 4 disagreed foremost with the standard of
review 55 that the majority used in determining the jury's interpretation of
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1869 (citing Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33, 94, 527 A.2d 3, 33 (1987), vacated, 109
S. Ct. 1860 (1988)). The dissenting judge remarked that twenty-five state cases utilized the
verdict form, and "no answer as to the existence of mitigating circumstances was ever left
blank." Mills, 108 S. Ct. at 1867 (citing Mills, 310 Md. at 94 n.9, 527 A.2d at 33 n.9).
149. The court of appeals may adopt rules of procedure to govern the conduct of a sentenc-
ing proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, and may prescribe forms for the court or
jury's use in making its written findings and determinations of sentence. Mills, 108 S. Ct. at
1869; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(l) (1987).
150. MD. RULE PROC. 4-343(e) (amended July 27, 1987, effective August 17, 1987).
151. Mills, 108 S. Ct. at 1869. The section concerning the mitigating circumstances was
completely rewritten to provide the jury three response options for each listed mitigating cir-
cumstance. The jury may declare that i) it unanimously finds the mitigating circumstance to
exist; ii) it unanimously finds the mitigating circumstance does not exist; or iii) one or more of
the jurors finds that the mitigating circumstance exists. Id. Moreover, the new form expressly
requires the jury to write down any additional mitigating factor(s) not listed but either agreed
upon unanimously or found by one or more jurors. Id.; see also MD. RULE PROC. 4-343.
Form 4-343 in effect rejects Judge McAuliffe's argument in Mills v. State that the unanimity
requirement does not apply to historic questions of fact, namely the nonexistence of a mitigat-
ing factor.
152. Mills, 108 S. Ct. at 1870. "When erroneous instructions are given, retrial is often
required. It is quite simply a hallmark of our legal system that juries be carefully and ade-
quately guided in their deliberations." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976).
153. Mills, 108 S. Ct. at 1870. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of
appeals with regard to the imposition of the death penalty and remanded the case for re-
sentencing.
154. Id. at 1872. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissenting opinion. Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and Kennedy joined in the dissent.
155. Id. at 1875 ("unless we can rule out the substantial possibility that the jury may have
rested its verdict on an improper construction of the sentencing instructions and jury charges,
petitioner's sentence must be set aside."); see id. at 1867 (Blackmun, J.).
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the statute. 156 The dissent maintained that the relevant inquiry is not
whether the jury could possibly misinterpret the sentencing instructions, but
rather whether a reasonable juror could have understood the charge.1 57 In-
deed, the dissent argued that the degree of assurance required by the major-
ity when determining whether the jury may have rested its verdict on an
improper ground is an unobtainable goal due in large part to the secret na-
ture of the jury proceedings and the inability to ascertain the judgment of
each individual juror. 
58
The dissent further maintained that a reasonable juror would understand
from the judge's instructions and the verdict form that a negative response
signified the jury's unanimous finding that no mitigating circumstance ex-
isted. ' 9 The dissent disagreed with the majority's reliance on the Lockett
rule that the issue is whether the jury heard all extenuating evidence." 6
Rather, the dissent argued that the proper inquiry was whether a reasonable
jury's interpretation of the sentencing instructions would have allowed the
consideration of this mitigating evidence in a constitutional manner.
16
Finding that only one reasonable interpretation of the sentencing instruc-
tions was possible 62 under the "reasonable juror" standard, 63 the dissent
voted to uphold the death sentence. 164
156. Id. at 1875 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1873. The dissent cited California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987), to support its
position. However, the majority also cited Brown. Mills, 108 S. Ct. at 1866. Thus, the major-
ity and dissent applied the rule laid out in Brown differently to support their own positions.
158. Mills, 108 S. Ct. at 1875; see FED. R. EvID. 606. The Notes of the Advisory Commit-
tee for Rule 606(b) state:
Under the federal decisions the central focus has been upon insulation of the manner
in which the jury reached its verdict, and this protection extends to each of the com-
ponents of deliberation, including arguments, statement, discussions, mental and
emotional reaction, votes and any other feature of the process.... The mental opera-
tions and emotional reactions of jurors in arriving at a given result would, if allowed
as a subject of inquiry, place every verdict at the mercy of jurors and invite tampering
and harassment.
Id.
159. Mills at 1873. "Over and over again the trial court exhorted the jury that every deter-
mination made on the sentencing form had to be a unanimous one." Id. at 1874.
160. Id. at 1875. The dissent claimed that undoubtedly the jury heard all mitigating evi-
dence. However, the majority did not consider the issue as whether or not the jury heard all
mitigating evidence. Rather, the majority concentrated on what the jury considered when it
determined whether to impose the death penalty.
161. Id. at 1875.
162. Id. at 1873 ("[T]here is absolutely no reason to think that this meaning was not abun-
dantly plain to the jurors acting under these instructions.").
163. Id. at 1875.
164. Id.
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D. Faulty Sentencing Instructions in Death Sentence Determinations
The history of the Mills case alone supported the majority opinion in Mills
v. Maryland. If the Supreme Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals
could not agree on a single interpretation of the sentencing instructions, it
was unlikely that a jury of lay people could have properly interpreted the
instructions either. The majority in Mills recognized the substantial possibil-
ity of juror misinterpretation and consequently refused to uphold the death
sentence. 165 The majority refused to allow the possibility that even one juror
was precluded from considering a mitigating factor due to faulty sentencing
instructions. 
166
The majority opinion reflected the attitude that if a jury has the responsi-
bility of determining whether to execute a person, that person is at least
entitled to the guarantee that the sentencing instructions given to the jury
leave no room for misinterpretation. The majority did not overturn Mills'
conviction, but merely vacated the death sentence and remanded it for resen-
tencing.167 Thus, the majority opinion, which refused to allow any room for
error in the sentencing instructions, continued to endorse the concept of cer-
tainty in death sentence determinations that Furman initiated.
1 68
The dissent, on the other hand, believed that there is room for uncertainty
in capital cases. By using the "reasonable juror" standard,' 69 the dissent
ignored the central concern of the majority: that the jury may have imposed
the death penalty on Mills not because it wanted to, but rather because,
based on the sentencing instructions, it had to impose the death sentence.
III. MILLS V. MARYLAND'S EFFECT ON THE FURMAN TREND
A. The Furman Trend
The goal of capital sentencing schemes is to comply with the basic pur-
poses behind Furman v. Georgia, the elimination of erratic and irregular cap-
ital sentencing caused by unbridled jury discretion. 7 ' Guided sentencing




169. See supra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
170. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976). This is a far cry from the
Court's reasoning in McGautha, which stated that the State may
assume that jurors confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing
death for a fellow human will act with due regard for the consequences of their
decision and will consider a variety of factors, many of which will have been sug-
gested by the evidence or by the arguments of defense counsel.
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208 (1971).
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discretion is the key behind a fair and reasonably consistent manner of im-
posing the death penalty.' 7 ' The Supreme Court has established several
guiding measures for state legislatures to adopt in their capital punishment
statutes to guarantee the constitutionality of the statutes.' 72 Consideration
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances provides for individualized sen-
tencing because by viewing the character of the defendant, his record, and
the circumstances of the offense,' 73 the jury evaluates the totality of the cir-
cumstances in determining whether it, as a voice of community values,
should impose a penalty less severe than death. The rule in Lockett, which
required that the sentencer consider the individual characteristics of the of-
fender,'74 acknowledged the idea that a consistency which results from ig-
noring individual differences is in effect no consistency.' 5 Mitigating
circumstances provide the possibility of leniency.' 76 The consideration of
unlimited mitigating evidence precludes capricious death sentence determi-
nations and provides for capricious mercy determinations., 77
B. Mills v. Maryland Continued the Furman Trend
In Mills v. Maryland, the Court reemphasized the necessity of a reliable
decision before imposing the death penalty in order to guarantee that the
sentencing authority exercised its guided discretion in a fair manner pursu-
ant to the fourteenth amendment's due process clause and the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.' 78 In refusing to
uphold a death sentence returned by a jury that may have been precluded
from considering all mitigating evidence,' 79 the majority in Mills v. Mary-
land recognized the "qualitative difference"' 8 ° between the death penalty
171. Special Project, supra note 11, at 1134-35.
172. These measures include: 1) bifurcated trial and sentencing proceedings; 2) a list of
statutory aggravating circumstances; and 3) automatic judicial review of death sentences. See
Comment, supra note 109, at 690.
173. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
601-05 (1978); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
197 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. 325, 333-34, 636-37 (1976).
174. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05.
175. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112.
176. See supra note 30.
177. Comment, supra note 109, at 699.
178. Special Project, supra note 11, at 1132.
179. Mills v. Maryland, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 1870 (1988) ("Under our cases, the sentencer
must be permitted to consider all mitigating evidence. The possibility that a single juror could
block such consideration, and consequently require the jury to impose the death penalty, is one
we dare not risk.").
180. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
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and other punishments. '8 1
Furman and its progeny established a method of guaranteeing a capital
offender his constitutional rights by requiring individualized sentencing and
consistency in death sentence determinations. 8 2  The Mills decision ex-
tended this method of guaranteeing consistency one step further. Not only
must individualized sentencing be present in death penalty determinations,
but if there is even a possibility that the jury did not consider every mitigat-
ing factor, the sentence will not stand. The Mills decision illustrated the
majority's uneasiness toward capital punishment. Although the Court did
not hold capital punishment unconstitutional per se,' 3 the Court refused to
tolerate any risk of arbitrariness or unfairness due to faulty sentencing in-
structions. Accordingly, the Court has established another mechanism to
prevent the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.
Unlike Furman, the Mills Court did not discuss how broad the sentencing
authority's discretion could reach before it actually infringed on the of-
fender's right to individualized sentencing. Rather, the Mills Court assumed
that caselaw has adequately determined how to guarantee a fair and consti-
tutional sentencing procedure.'8 g The crux of the Mills decision is the re-
view of the sentencing instructions to determine whether they violated the
Lockett rule. After years of developing a constitutionally sound method of
181. The death penalty is final and "is unique in its total irrevocability." Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). The majority in Mills recognized the
unique quality of the death penalty by imposing such a strict standard on the review of death
sentences, namely that if there is a possibility that the sentence rested on improper grounds, it
must be set aside. Mills, 108 S. Ct. at 1866. It appears that by putting such a high standard of
review on death sentences, the majority in Mills was interested in having the sentencing proce-
dures following constitutional guidelines as closely as possible. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 605 (1978) ("Given the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly different
from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an individualized decision is
essential in capital cases.").
182. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
183. The Furman Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the death penalty itself,
although Justices Brennan and Marshall have consistently argued that capital punishment is
cruel and unusual per se. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 370 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 228-31 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (both Justice Brennan's and Justice Marshall's opinions
also applied to Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976)); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 619 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) (Justice Brennan took
no part in consideration or decision of the Lockett case); Mills, 108 S. Ct. at 1872 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
184. See Mills, 108 S. Ct. at 1865. The Court cited cases holding that the sentencer may
not be precluded from considering mitigating circumstances. See Skipper v. South Carolina,
476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 114 (1982); Lockett, 438 U.S. at
604. Whether the sentencing instructions precluded the Mills jury from considering any miti-




implementing the death penalty, the Mills Court required an additional pro-
cedural safeguard.185 By requiring certainty in the sentencing instructions
and consequently in the imposition of death sentences, the Mills Court main-
tained that the method developed from Furman and its progeny, in some
cases, may not be a sufficient safeguard to prevent arbitrary and inconsistent
death penalty determinations.
C. The Future Effect of Mills v. Maryland
The Mills v. Maryland decision essentially required a stricter standard of
review of sentencing instructions used in death sentence determinations. Af-
ter Mills, if the possibility exists that a single juror was precluded from con-
sidering any mitigating factor due to faulty instructions, the reviewing court
must vacate the death sentence. 18 6 The purpose of Mills was to guarantee
certainty in death sentences. The Mills decision probably will result in re-
viewing courts vacating several death sentences. 187 The Supreme Court's
decision in Mills v. Maryland illustrated the majority's willingness to con-
tinue protecting capital offenders from unconstitutional death sentences.
The Supreme Court has consistently made it more difficult for the state to
execute its citizens, and Mills v. Maryland stands as another constitutional
roadblock to the execution chamber.
IV. CONCLUSION
The eighth amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, and con-
sequently, the Supreme Court has devoted much attention to determining
the constitutionality of death penalty statutes. The decision in Mills v.
Maryland represented a continuation of the trend established in Furman v.
Georgia. In Mills, the majority concurred with the Furman Court that capi-
tal punishment statutes must guarantee the fair and consistent imposition of
the death penalty through guided sentencing discretion and individualized
sentencing procedures. The majority went a step further, however, by refus-
ing to uphold a death sentence if a possibility exists that the jury was pre-
cluded from considering any mitigating factor. The basis for this refusal was
185. See Mills, 108 S. Ct at 1866. The Court argues that greater certainty is required, and
always has been, in reviewing death sentences. Id. The additional procedural safeguard is the
requirement that a death sentence be vacated if there is a possibility that it rests on unconstitu-
tional grounds. Id. Thus, this safeguard already technically existed. However, the Mills ma-
jority is guaranteeing that reviewing courts implement it when considering death sentences.
186. See, e.g., Lloyd v. North Carolina, 109 S. Ct. 38, 39 (1988); State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123,
130-31, 548 A.2d 887, 890 (1988); State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 325-27, 548 A.2d 939,
991-92 (1988); State v. Colvin, 314 Md. 1, 25, 548 A.2d 506, 517-18 (1988); Jones v. State, 314
Md. 111, 112, 549 A.2d 17, 17 (1988); State v. Hines, 758 S.W.2d 515, 524 (Tenn. 1988).
187. See supra note 186.
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the nature of the punishment itself. Therefore, consideration of any mitigat-
ing factor that might call for a punishment less severe than death is not the
last step before execution. It is up to the reviewing court to guarantee that
the jury was sufficiently guided and directed, through proper instruction,
such that it afforded the defendant individualized sentencing, or the death
sentence must be vacated.
Mills v. Maryland was a compassionate decision and a good decision. Be-
cause it granted more protection to the convicted capital offender, the Court
helped reduce the possibility that the jury would base its sentencing determi-
nation on unconstitutional grounds. The Mills decision, which followed
from a history of aversion toward arbitrary and capricious capital punish-
ment in American society, reemphasized the Court's recognition of the need
for reliability when imposing death sentences.
Miranda B. Strassmann
